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3 AUG 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Training and Education

FROM:

Director of Security

SUBJECT: Department of Defense Policy on Background
Investigations of DoD Personnel Attending CIA
Courses

REFERENCE: Your memo of 24 July 1981, same Subject

1. The Office of Security is familiar with the memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated 8 June 1981, to which you refer in Reference. The policy reflected in the memorandum has been studied in terms of certification of basic security clearances and variance from DCID 1/14 standards. The resulting determination is that we will not accept a Top Secret certification based on a "Personal Interview-Oriented Background Investigation" now to be conducted in lieu of a background investigation.

2. With specific reference to your concern, DoD personnel holding an SCI access approval(s) granted within five years would be eligible to attend CIA courses, since DoD has not yet adopted the "new type BI" in lieu of existing DCID 1/14 standards. Those holding SCI access approvals who have been reinvestigated within five years are also eligible. However, if no reinvestigation has been conducted within a five-year period of the date of entry of a trainee in a CIA course, the nominee is not eligible until the Defense Intelligence Service completes at least the minimum reinvestigation prescribed in DCID 1/14.

3. The Office of Security position is grounded in the statutory authority of the DCI to protect sources and methods which clearly and specifically includes matters addressed by DCID. We cannot accept unilateral abrogation of a DCI mandate by any member of the Intelligence Community. The DoD position, as it applies to reinvestigation under DCID 1/14 standards, represents such unilateral action and under no circumstances will it be endorsed by a waiver of our security standards.

4. A reasonable solution to your immediate problem would be to present CIA training as worthy of "acute case" treatment. As a practical matter (as opposed to application of institutional policy), the numbers involved and the limited reinvestigation required would have no significant impact on Defense Investigative Service resources.



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